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Mann: Best Evidence Rule--When Applied
STUDENT NOTES ANID RECENT CASES
BEST EVIDENCE RULE-WIEN APPLiED.-The earliest statement
of the Best Evidence Rule seems to have appeared about 1700
when Holt, C. J., speaking for the court in Ford v. Hopkins, said:
"The best proof the nature of the thing will afford is only required." This phrase was adopted by the courts and continued to
hold great place throughout the eighteenth century. Wiles, J.,
resorted to the rule in 1744 in the famous case of Om2ychwnd v.
Barker and Lord Hardwicke, sitting as Chancellor said, "The
judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but
one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case
'will allow." This rule in substantially this form was used by
most of the text book writers in the nineteenth century and has
-been used by our own Supreme Court of Appeals.' Professor
Thayer in commenting on this statement of the rule says, "This
old principle has outlived its usefulness. 1 1 * It is accompanied
now with so many explanations and qualifications as to indicate
the need of some simpler and truer statement, which would exclude any mention of this as a working rule in our system. * * *
Regarded as a general rule, the trouble with it is that it is not
true to the facts and does not hold out in its application, and in
so far as it does apply it is unnecessary and uninstructive." 3
Whatever may have been the early conception of the Best Evidence Rule, its application, by the better view, is, broadly speaking, now limited to cases where the contents of a written document
are directly in issue.4 "The rule applies only to the terms of the
document and not to any other facts about the document." In
other words the rule applies to exclude testimony designed to establish the terms of the document and requires the document's
production instead, but does not apply to exclude the testimony
which concerns the document without aiming to establish its
terms. ' '

The West Virginia Court has followed this view in DixonPocahontas Fuel Company v. Myers Grain Company.' In that
case the Fuel Company, the Grain Company and a bank of
Columbus, Ohio, all claimed funds in the hands of the Bank of
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 489 ff.
2 Chicago Art Co. v. Thacker, 65 W. Va. 143, 63 S. E. 770 (1909).
1

a THAYER, supra, n. 1.

4
443
r
6

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §1242; 10 R. C. L. 904; Sirrine v. Briggs, 31 Mich.
(1875).
WIGOORE, supra, n.1.
71 W. Va. 715, 77 S. E. 362 (1913).
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Mt. Hope at Mt. Hope, West Virginia. Title to the funds were
evidenced by a sight draft drawn by the Grain Company, discounted by the Columbus bank and collected by the bank of Mt.
Hope. To prove its claim the Columbus bank did not produce
the original draft nor account for its non-production but did offer in evidence copies of the draft. The copies were objected to
because they were not the best evidence. The court held the
copies were admissible and the Best Evidence Rule did not apply
'because "it was not a question of proving the contents of a
paper." ' This case restricts the application of the Best Evidence
Rule to cases where the contents of a written document are in
issue and is in,accord with the best authority.
But in the recent case of Thompson, Administrator v. Turkey
Gap Coal & Coke Companys the court seems to make a rather
doubtful application of the Best Evidence Rule. In that case one
Bartee, alleged to be under the age of sixteen years, was injured
while dmployed by the Turkey Gap Coal & Coke Company. In
an action by Bartee's administrator for damages resulting from
the injuries, the pivotal question was the deceased's age. The
evidence offered was the family Bible into which the date of deceased's birth had been copied by his mother about six years
prior to the accident. This record was copied from an entry in
another book made by the mother at the time of deceased's birth.
The original record was not shown to be unavailable. The court
held that the record offered was not admissible because it violated the Best Evidence Rule; that the evidence offered was secondary and that the original record was the best evidence.
This decision seems to be based upon the earlier conception of
the Best Evidence Rule. By the test set out above and generally
supported by modern authorities this rule applies only when the
contents of a written document are in issue. In the principal
case the issue is not the contents of a writing but the age of the
deceased. There is a clear distinction between proving the age of
the deceased which is evidenced by a writing and proving the
contents of the writing itself. The terms of the writing form no
part of the issue and the essential fact to be proved is not the
contents of the writing but a fact extrinsic to the writing. It is
submitted that the case does not offer a satisfactory situation for
the application of the Best Evidence Rule.0
7 See also as tending in the same direction State v,.Davis, 74 W. Va. 857,
82 S. E. 525 (1914).
8 104 W. Va. 134, 139 S. E. 642 (1927).
9 In substantial accord with the principal case see Chicago Art Co. v.
Thacker, supra, n. 2.
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STUDENT NOTES AND REGENT GASES
Whether the actual conclusion reached in the principal case
can be justified by an application of the Hearsay Rule is a question not within the purview of this note.
-FLETCHER

MURDER-DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

W. MANN.

FIRST AND SECOND

DEGREE-

INCONSISTENCY IN SOMTE WEST VIRGINIA CASES.-Chapter 144, Section 1 of BAREs' WEST VIRGINIA CODE of 1923, says "Murder by
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,
* - [and homicides in the
commission of, or attempt to commit certain enumerated felonies,
(see also chapter 148, see. 13)] * * * is murder of the first degree. All other murder is of the second degree". This act is
based on the Virginia Code of 1860, and the original statute was
enacted much earlier than that. As these two degrees of murder
are statutory and unknown, to the common law, the first inquiry
must be as to what constitutes murde at common law; and having found the answer, the next logical step is to exclude therefrom all that which the legislature has declared to be first degree murder, which leaves, because of the "all other" clause, a
residue of second degree.
For the purposes of this note no attempt at an all inclusive
classification of common law murder need be given, as it is sufficient to state that a killing accompanied by malice aforethought,-malice prepense,-is essential. This proposition is elementary and needs no authority to support it. Malice aforethought is either express or implied, and it is in regard to the
implied malice that. the difficulty arises. It is the former in
cases where the accused has made threats or otherwise expressly
shown malice, and the latter in cases where the surrounding circumstances are such that the killing can only be accounted for on
the supposition of design or intent. Courts applying the rules
of common law in cases involving no degrees of murder have laid
down that when a homicide occurs in the commission of any
felony, or in the resistence of a lawful arrest, the offense is murder even though the killing was unintentional, for there the malice
prepense is implied by law. Regina v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287
(1862); State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578; Boyd v.
State, 17 Ga. 194 (1855) ; Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550,
11 S. W. 651. It has also been held that malice aforethought may
be implied when the act which causes the death is done "deib'
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